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Extensive research on the impact of high school vocational education on post-
school earnings has produced mixed results. Some studies find wage gains only for 
individuals who work in an occupation that is directly related to the vocational training 
received in high school. We shed light on this debate by focusing on a single occupation 
and by comparing the careers of individuals with and without occupation-related training 
in high school. We use a rich longitudinal data set that captures the careers of cohorts of 
military recruits who complete high school military science classes via the JROTC 
program.  JROTC shares characteristics with both vocational training and school-to-
career programs. We find that the occupation-specific training received via JROTC 
reduces short run turnover and improves longer run job stability for those who choose 
military jobs, suggesting that one important effect of vocational training is to improve the 
quality of the job match. We also find that vocational trainees promote at higher rates 
after four years in the job; however, this is due to the head start provided by the 









WHAT DOES OCCUPATION-RELATED VOCATIONAL EDUCATION DO?   
EVIDENCE FROM AN INTERNAL LABOR MARKET 
 
I. Introduction 
The role of vocational education in the high school curriculum has been a 
controversial area in education reform debates in the U.S. (Bishop, 1989; Levesque, et 
al., 2000).  The controversy has been fueled in part by the inconsistent results in prior 
studies on the impact of vocational education on graduates’ labor market success.  
Several studies find positive earnings effects of vocational education while others find no 
differences (for a survey see Bishop and Mane, 2004). One reason for the inconsistent 
results is that positive wage gains may accrue only when vocational graduates work in 
occupations that are directly related to their vocational training (Neumann and Ziderman, 
1991; 1993).  This finding raises questions about the effectiveness of vocational 
education since only 43% of vocational graduates work in occupations that match their 
training (Bishop, 1989).  Hotchkiss (1993), on the other hand, finds that wage gains are 
most likely due to the choice of occupation rather than to vocational education or to 
working in a training-related occupation. Further complicating the picture, Meer (2007) 
finds that high school students sort themselves into tracks (vocational, academic) based 
on comparative advantage, and this self-selection accounts for the wage gains to 
vocational students. This controversy highlights the need to better understand the specific 
channels via which high school vocational education affects labor market outcomes.  
Our study sheds light on this debate by analyzing the impact of vocational 
education for workers in a broadly-defined occupation.  By examining the effects of 
vocational education within an occupation we avoid confounding occupation and 
 2 
vocational training effects. In addition, we look at a broader range of employment-related 
outcomes than in prior studies, including job attachment, job performance, and career 
progression.   Economists generally have concentrated on wage or employment effects of 
vocational education. Industrial psychologists, who have studied effects on productivity, 
find that not only do occupational skills have a direct impact on worker productivity, but 
that their effect tends to exceed that of academic skills (Bishop 1989; Kang and Bishop, 
1989).    
By assessing the effect of vocational education on career progression and 
performance within an occupation, our goal is to identify the links between job 
knowledge and productivity.  For example, vocational education in high school may 
result in more stable or longer careers within an occupation because it improves 
information on specific jobs and professions (sorting effect). Alternatively, vocational 
education may enhance job skills in a particular profession or broad occupational group, 
thus increasing worker productivity and resulting in more successful careers (human 
capital effect). Our study also investigates reasons why the wage effects of vocational 
education may be more pronounced for those who work in a training-related occupation.  
The analysis exploits a specific high school program in military science, Junior 
Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (JROTC), which is similar to other vocational-type 
programs.  We exploit the unique link between JROTC and the military as the primary 
employer to identify individuals who pursue a career that matches their military 
vocational training in high school.  Using a rich dataset of all new Navy recruits between 
1994 and 2002 we compare the turnover and job performance of new ‘hires’ who did and 
did not complete high school JROTC. Military data are particularly well suited for this 
 3 
investigation, since the military represents at the same time a single employer and a 
single broad occupational category.1 These data also contribute to the vocational 
education literature by providing evidence on career progression of vocational trainees 
within an internal labor market (see Rosen, 1992; Asch and Warner, 2001).  The 
military’s highly structured hierarchical personnel system allows us to hold constant 
several important factors that can confound the estimated effects of vocational education.   
For example, one possibility not considered by prior studies is that new hires with 
vocational education may earn higher wages because they receive more firm-specific 
training than other new hires without vocational education. Since vocational graduates 
enter with a basic knowledge of the occupation, industry, or the specific employer, the 
firm would be more likely to offer them more advanced training or place them on fast 
tracks that result in steeper wage profiles. In the military, however, basic training is 
standardized for all new hires. 
Publicly available data sources typically used to investigate vocational education 
do not allow for a within-occupation analysis of career progression. This is due partly to 
small samples for each identifiable occupation and due partly to lack of information on 
the careers within each occupation (which requires longitudinal internal firm data).2 
Furthermore, most vocational programs do not lead to one specific occupation. Indeed, 
the literature often lumps together several occupations that share similar characteristics 
when defining occupation-related training.3 Matching vocational courses with occupation 
                                                 
1 The military represents an ‘occupational cluster’ rather than a single homogeneous occupation (see 
Levesque et al., 2008).  Moreover, as we discuss below the occupational clusters tend to differ across 
military branches. 
2 Hill (1989) analyzes effects of technical education on promotion, turnover, and time-to-train in several 
occupations for several employers, but concentrates on post-secondary training. 
3 In analyzing the vocational-education occupation match, Neuman and Ziderman (1999), for example, 
identify eight major occupational categories for vocational education, whereas Hotchkiss (1993) identifies 
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can be crucial to determining whether occupational choice or vocational education 
explains higher wages.  Studies that do not control for occupational self-selection leave 
open the possibility that vocational education improves labor market outcomes by 
improving the self-selection of individuals into occupations rather than by improving 
occupational skills. By holding constant the occupation (and, thus, the self-selection of 
individuals into the occupation), our study permits a closer examination of the ways in 
which vocational education affects career outcomes.  Studies that deal with such self-
selection do not identify the channels through which vocational education increases 
earnings – through information about the occupation, or by increasing human capital in a 
particular field. For policy purposes the distinction is important as it helps shape and 
improves the delivery of vocational education.  
II. Background 
The JROTC program currently enrolls over 500,000 students in more than 3,300 
high schools (nearly 20% of all public high schools).4  Even though the program shares 
elements of both a vocational education and a school-to-work (STW) program,5 it largely 
has been overlooked by social science researchers.  This oversight may arise from the 
perception that military science classes represent ‘special interest’ activities rather than 
                                                                                                                                                 
only two broad categories. It should be noted that, in general, the vocational education literature defines 
“occupation” in a broad sense. This could be due in part to the way that vocational courses are classified as 
linking to various occupations. For example, one of the nine vocational areas identified by the Department 
of Education is “agriculture and renewable resources,” which includes farmers and other farm occupations, 
forestry, fishing, veterinary assistants, and gardening workers (Levesque et al., 2000). 
4 Program data is taken from Coumbe, Kotakis, and Gammell (2008), Crawford, Thomas, and Estrada 
(2004), and Laurence and Estrada (2003). 
5 STW programs include school-based learning, work-based learning, and connecting activities. School-
based learning includes academic and vocational courses, whereas work-based learning includes hands-on 
job training, mentoring, and instruction in a workplace (through internships and apprenticeships, for 
example). STW connection activities establish partnerships with industries to ease the school-to-work 
transition. Similarly, JROTC activities are comparable to STW initiatives such as job shadowing, 
mentoring, and internships, which are intended to increase job market skills of young people, and guide 
them toward future careers.  
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programs intended to affect employment outcomes. The U.S. Department of Education 
(DOE) classifies high school military science classes as ‘enrichment/other’ rather than 
vocational education (Levesque et al., 2000). This designation appears to contradict 
DOE’s own definition of career technical education (CTE) as classes that teach “….skills 
required in specific occupations or occupational clusters” (Levesque, et al., 2008, p. 3).6  
This classification also misrepresents the scope and content of JROTC.7  As we discuss 
below, the curriculum design, the use of military instructors, and the close link with the 
employer all serve to reinforce the program’s clear occupational orientation.  JROTC 
‘concentrators’ (those with at least 3.0 Carnegie credits in military science) earn an 
advanced pay grade if they choose to enlist, and about 40% of JROTC concentrators do 
enter the military (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1999).8 This is very 
close to the estimated percentage of vocational students who find employment in an 
occupation related to their training (Bishop, 1989). As a result, JROTC-trainees appear to 
be very similar to vocational trainees in other (civilian) areas.   
                                                 
6 The U.S. Department of Education (1987) labels military employment as a ‘non-labor market activity,’ 
which contradicts how labor economists analyze military manpower supply issues.  In an all-volunteer 
military, employment in the military is a voluntary occupational choice made by youth (predominantly 
recent high school graduates) who weigh the monetary and non-pecuniary attributes of available jobs.  
These attributes include relative pay, any bonuses offered, training opportunities, and the arduousness and 
risk of the occupation.  Like other employers, the military sets minimum standards for entry, based in part 
on AFQT scores and high school graduation (see Asch and Hosek, 2007; Warner and Asch, 2001), and 
must offer compensation packages sufficient to attract and retain the required quantity and quality of 
personnel (Hosek and Sharp, 2001). 
7 There is a second inconsistency in how DOE defines vocational classes.  For secondary schools DOE 
defines an occupational category called ‘protective services,’ which does not include military science 
classes, whereas for college courses the same ‘protective services’ vocational category does include 
college-level military science classes (Levesque et al., 2008). 
8 It is noteworthy that the earnings of enlistees during a 4-year enlistment exceed the median earnings of 
comparable non-college-bound high school graduates.  JROTC concentrators enter the military at pay 
grades E2 or E3, while other recruits generally enter at E1. In 2008 an enlistee in pay grade E3 with two 
years of service earned $36,352 in base pay and non-taxable allowances, the equivalent of $40,422 in 
taxable earnings (retrieved January 11, 2009 from 
www.defenselink.mil/militarypay/mpcales/calculator/RMC.aspx).  In contrast, median civilian earnings for 
a 20 to 24-year-old male (all industries, all occupations) were $25,012 (retrieved January 11, 2009 from 
www.bls.gov). 
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 Like vocational education and STW programs, JROTC offers both academic and 
vocational courses and is linked with a specific employer. The curriculum includes core 
subjects such as citizenship, communications, geography, health and wellness, and 
physical fitness. Each unit is affiliated with one of the four military branches and each 
uses retired military personnel as instructors.9  In addition to general military courses, 
such as military history, national security issues, and leadership, each JROTC program 
includes courses in subjects related to their specific branch.  For example, the Army 
JROTC curriculum includes geography, earth sciences, and orienteering, whereas the Air 
Force curriculum includes aerospace and aerodynamics.  Core classes in the Navy 
curriculum are military structure and operations, military law, naval science (including 
sea navigation, rules of the road, and shipboard life), oceanography, meteorology, and 
Navy tactics and strategy (Laurence and Estrada, 2004; Coumbe, Kotakis, and Gammell, 
2008).10   
 Prior research on JROTC is limited.  Elliott et al. (2002) analyze a federal pilot 
program in 1992 that combined career academies with required JROTC participation.11  
They find that JROTC Partnership Academy students had better academic achievement 
than both students in a general track and ‘regular’ JROTC students.  Pema and Mehay 
(2009a; b) investigate several academic and post-school outcomes for regular JROTC 
students.  They find that JROTC students are two to four times as likely to enlist as their 
                                                 
9 Local school districts hire the instructors who are compensated jointly by the school district and the 
Defense Department. 
10 The JROTC curriculum covers 180 hours per year, which translates to 1.0 credit. Generally, 130 hours 
are devoted to the core subjects, while 50 hours can be taken in optional or elective courses.  The learning 
approach stresses group discussion, learning by doing, and teaching others as opposed to lecture.  JROTC 
programs are accredited by the Commission on International and Trans-Regional Accreditation (CITA), 
which is used because some JROTC units are located abroad. 
11 The ‘Federal-Local Partnership for Serving At-Risk Youth Program’ was sponsored by both the 
Department of Education and Defense and attempted to combine the strengths of JROTC with the career 
academy focus on work-based learning (Hansen and Robyn, 2000). 
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peers. The authors find no employment effects for JROTC students who do not enlist, 
suggesting that program effects may be confined to those choosing an occupation related 
to the military training.   
III. Data 
We analyze pooled data on all recruit cohorts who entered the Navy between 
1994 and 2001 and signed 4-year contracts.  Each cohort member is tracked until 
separation or 5 years after entry. The Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) provided 
the personnel data, which contained 367, 241 observations. We focus solely on recruits 
with 4-year contracts to keep the length of initial skill training and follow-on career paths 
homogeneous. We also remove those with prior military service because they may have 
different tastes for the military than the typical new recruit and will have different career 
paths.  Applying these restrictions left 329,180 observations.  All JROTC recruits in our 
data set earned at least 3.0 JROTC credits in high school, which is the equivalent of an 
‘occupational concentrator,’ as defined by DOE (Levesque et al., 2000; 2003). 
To investigate the effects of occupational-related vocational education on job 
match, we analyze the link between completing high school JROTC and: (a) turnover 
during a recruit’s 4-year contract term; and (b) voluntary reenlistment decisions at the 
expiration of the 4-year contract. Early military turnover (called ‘attrition’) reflects job 
mismatch and all such mismatches result in an individual being discharged, whether the 
source of the mismatch is the individual or the military.12  We analyze reenlistment 
decisions at the expiration of the first contract to determine the effect of JROTC on job 
stability.  Unlike attrition behavior, manpower analysts generally treat reenlistment 
                                                 
12 Klein et al. (1991) show that official discharge reasons seldom identify the true reason for the mis-match 
and Buddin (1984) points out that it is difficult to distinguish military ‘quits’ from ‘fires.’   
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behavior as a voluntary occupational choice based on expected future civilian and 
military earnings (Daula and Moffitt, 1995). Those who are well matched to the military 
will promote at a faster pace, which increases military earnings and provides incentives to 
stay.  Turnover and reenlistment are indicators of job match and stability, which, for 
youth labor markets appear to be problematic (Yates, 2005).  Neumark (2002) shows that 
unstable early job market experiences may have lasting adverse effects on adult labor 
market outcomes.  
In contrast to prior studies that examine wages as indirect productivity indicators, 
we utilize an objective measure of productivity.  Our measure of performance is based on 
being promoted during the 4-year contract.  Position in the hierarchy accurately reflects 
military productivity since promotions (beyond E3) are highly competitive and are based 
on demonstrated performance, supervisors’ evaluations, and skill qualification exams 
(Williamson, 1999).13 Hence, we analyze the effect of JROTC on the grade level attained 
at the end of the contract. We also condition this effect upon entry grade to investigate 
whether wage differences are due to faster career progression within the firm, or due to 
the head start provided to JROTC graduates, who enter at advanced pay grades.   
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 1 provide descriptive statistics for ‘new hires’ with and 
without JROTC. One notable difference is that recruits with JROTC backgrounds are 
more likely to be female or black, and to have lower AFQT scores than other recruits. 
They also have lower attrition rates and higher reenlistment rates. The next section 
investigates whether observed performance differences are systematic and whether they 
                                                 
13
 The personnel system consists of nine grades.  The first three grades, (E1-E3) represent trainee and 
apprentice positions, the middle three grades (E4-E6) represent technician and work group manager/leader 
positions, and the three highest grades (E7-E9) represent supervisory positions (Williamson, 1999). During 
the initial 4-year contract, promotion to grade 4 (E4, petty officer third class) represents the target career 
progression for new entrants. 
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can be attributed to the vocational training received in high school.  
IV. Estimating the Effect of JROTC on Careers 
We first propose the following model for estimating the effects of vocational 
education on attrition, reenlistment, and promotion: 
( )1 2 31 0 ,    1,...,                                          (1)i i i i i iy JROTC u i Nδ β β β= + + + + > =X A M  
 
where yit denotes the selected outcomes, Xi includes demographics (race/ethnicity, 
gender, marital status, dependents, and an interaction of the last two variables). Mi 
represents institutional-specific variables, including eight cohort dummies and dummies 
for 10 military occupational areas. After receiving initial (basic) training, recruits receive 
advanced training in a specific occupational field. Controlling for these occupational 
areas helps isolate the effect of high school vocational education from internal training. 
Cohort dummies proxy for civilian labor market conditions, as well other unmeasured 
differences across cohorts (due, for example, to fluctuations in recruiting policies). Ai 
includes AFQT scores and educational attainment prior to enlistment.   
 We estimate (1) via probit under the assumption that ui does not include 
unobservables correlated with program participation and outcomes. However, because 
JROTC participation and the choice of a military career may be jointly determined, the 
error term in a JROTC participation equation may be correlated with employment 
attachment. This correlation would be positive if individuals who participate in JROTC 
have a stronger taste for the military. Pema and Mehay (2009a, b) show that high school 
students who participate in JROTC have stronger preferences for military careers than 
their peers. In contrast to their studies, our sample includes only military recruits so taste-
selection is less problematic. However, if those with JROTC backgrounds have relatively 
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stronger tastes for the military, it is possible our job-attachment estimates would be 
positively biased.  
The correlation between JROTC participation and military careers could also be 
negative if JROTC attracts at-risk or disadvantaged students, who tend to have poorer 
employment prospects after high school. Pema and Mehay (2009a; b) find that JROTC 
students have more at-risk characteristics than other high school students:  they are more 
likely to live in single-parent and lower-income households, and to attend urban high 
schools with high enrollments of disadvantaged students. If JROTC recruits are 
negatively selected, then our baseline estimates of career success may be negatively 
biased. Since, a priori, it is unclear which effect dominates; we pursue alternative 
estimation methods to address the self-selection problem.  
First, we model participation in the program and enlistment as simultaneous 
decisions. Matching information from the recruits’ addresses before enlisting and schools 
in the area that offered JROTC, we instrument program participation with an indicator for 
whether any high schools in the zip code offered JROTC.14 For recruit i living in area j 
we specify the following model: 
{ }1 2 3 41 0 , 1,..., (2)ij ij i i i j ijy JROTC u    i N                            δ γ γ γ γ= + + + + + > =X A M L
 
 

















 The variable ZIPJROTCi is a dummy indicating the presence of a JROTC program 
                                                 
14 Zip codes for each recruit were provided in the DMDC personnel files.  The zip codes for each JROTC 
high school were obtained directly from the military’s cadet commands. 
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in a high school in the recruit’s zip code. Equation (3) assumes that program participation 
is a function of individual characteristics and ability (Xi, Ai), whether there are any 
schools that offer JROTC in the zip code (ZIPJROTCj), and local area characteristics (Lj, 
discussed below).  Identification requires that the excluded variable, ZIPJROTCj, predicts 
individual participation in JROTC among recruits, but is uncorrelated with unobserved 
factors associated with military career outcomes yij.  
 The first assumption appears reasonable since Pema and Mehay (2009b) show that 
over 80% of high school students who participate in JROTC do so if their school offers 
the program.15  In regressions described below, ZIPJROTCj always has statistically 
significant coefficients. The second condition for a valid instrument is that 
| , , ,ij ij i i i jE y JROTC
   X A M ,L  should not depend on whether schools in the recruit’s home 
area offered JROTC. Ideally, if schools randomly offered the program, ZIPJROTCj would 
not affect career outcomes other than through individual participation. Therefore, in the 
absence of school-level selection into JROTC, this model would adequately address 
individual self-selection. However, Pema and Mehay (2009b) find that JROTC programs 
tend to be placed in poor urban areas with high recruitment potential. Consequently, the 
program’s presence will be correlated with other unobserved characteristics of the recruit 
and the area. Both of these may affect career outcomes.  
 To deal with this problem, in equation (1) we explicitly control for economic and 
social characteristics of the local area (Lj) where the recruit lived before enlisting. These 
variables include county-level unemployment rates and per capita earnings for each year 
from 1990-2007. These variables and the time period chosen represent local economic 
                                                 
15 Some students take JROTC courses in other local schools when their own school does not offer JROTC.  
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conditions from the time that the recruits are in high school through their first term of 
service when they are making reenlistment decisions. From the 1990 and 2000 Censuses 
we also obtain county-level data on the number of people serving in the armed forces, 
population in poverty, and percent of the population that is black, Hispanic, or American 
Indian. Since placement of JROTC units tends to focus on poorer areas and those with 
high recruiting potential, we expect that the total military and poverty population (rather 
than percent of population in each category) will better control for local characteristics 
correlated with the presence of a JROTC unit. The inclusion of per capita income, 
unemployment, military presence, minorities, and poverty status allows the effect of our 
IV to emerge only via individual participation in JROTC.  These variables proxy for 
economic and social conditions in the area that affect the school’s ability to qualify for 
JROTC and that may also be correlated with job attachment and choice of the military as 
a future career.  
 If there are other local area characteristics that are unobservable and that are 
correlated both with student participation in JROTC and individuals’ career outcomes, 
our bivariate probit results would be biased. For example, if areas that offer JROTC in 
their high schools offer fewer career opportunities due to the type of industries and 
employers located in the area, we may observe that JROTC recruits are more likely to 
stay in the military. Although explicitly controlling for local unemployment, earnings, 
and poverty addresses this issue, the concern remains that there are other unobservable 
local conditions that affect both participation and career progression. In addition, the 
previous analysis controls for economic and social factors at the county level, which may 
be appropriate measures of labor market conditions, but may not fully capture the social 
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characteristics of the local area where the recruit attended high school (especially in 
highly-segregated areas).  
 To address these concerns, we also obtain program effects from comparing JROTC 
recruits with non-JROTC recruits from the same zip code. To do so, we estimate fixed 
effects models that net out both observable and unobservable characteristics at the zip 
code level that may be correlated with both career progression and the presence of 
JROTC in their schools. If we enhance the original model to include the unobserved 
characteristics of the local area lj 
we obtain: 
( )1 2 3 41 0 ,    1,..., ,   1,...,         (4)ij i i i i j j ijy JROTC l e i N j Jφ θ θ θ θ= + + + + + + > = =X A M L
 
If we assume that ije  follows a logistic distribution conditional on both observable and 
unobservable variables, then 
( ) ( )1 2 3 41| , , , , ,      (5)ij i i i j i j i i i i j jP y JROTC l JROTC lφ θ θ θ θ= =Λ + + + + +X A M L X A M L
 
can be estimated via conditional maximum likelihood. This approach provides estimates 
that are conditional upon both observable and unobservable area-specific effects Lj and lj.   
 For identification this method requires that both JROTC participation and the 
outcomes vary within a zip code. For example, fixed effects logit does not draw any 
information from local areas where none of the sampled recruits attrite from the Navy, or 
where all recruits reenlist. This also addresses the bias due to lj, since local unobservables 
could produce a never-attrite or always-reenlist outcome. This method effectively reduces 
the sample to areas with JROTC schools, and eliminates all recruits in areas without 
JROTC schools. Because most areas contain only one JROTC unit (operated by one of 
the four military branches), fixed effects estimates will not depend on branch-specific 
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program variation.  Compared to baseline and bivariate probit estimates, the fixed effects 
estimates are not contaminated by bias from the possible correlation of JROTCi with lj.  
V. Baseline Estimates  
Probit estimates of attrition and reenlistment are presented in panel A of Table 2. 
Prior research shows that females have more difficulty adapting to military life and tend 
to attrite at higher rates (Buddin 2005), thus we also estimate program effects separately 
by gender. It could be that females gain more from experiencing military life via JROTC 
without incurring a service obligation. Apprehensions about a military career could 
explain why more female recruits than males enter the military with JROTC 
backgrounds.  
We examine both short-term and long-term job attachment by analyzing attrition 
rates over various intervals – 12, 24, 36, and 48 months. The results indicate that JROTC 
participants have attrition rates between 3.1-3.5 percentage points lower than non-
participants (or 9-17%). If JROTC helps students make better-informed career decisions, 
we would expect program participants to have better and more stable job matches. The 
JROTC effect on turnover appears to be similar across males and females.  
Reenlistment estimates are presented in panel B of Table 2. We estimate 
reenlistment models for the sample of sailors who complete their contracts (stay at least 
36 months) and who are eligible to reenlist. According to these estimates, JROTC 
participation increases retention by 5.5 points (9%).16  If we assume that individuals who 
do not attrite early from the military have a stronger taste for the military or represent a 
better job match, then the JROTC effect obtained on the sample restricted to those who 
                                                 
16
 Full results are available upon request.    
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stay at least 36 months should provide a stronger test of the program effect on job 
stability. Conditional on surviving 36 months, we find that JROTC recruits are about 8% 
more likely to reenlist.   
V. Bivariate Probit Estimates 
 To control for the potentially simultaneous decision between joining JROTC and 
pursuing a military career, we next obtain bivariate probit estimates of the program 
effects on attrition and reenlistment. As an instrument for JROTC we use an indicator for 
whether any schools in the recruit’s zip code offered JROTC. About 41,176 recruits in 
our sample (16%) lived near a school that offered JROTC.17  
Attrition and reenlistment results are presented in Table 3. After instrumenting for 
the potentially endogenous program participation, we find that the program has an even 
stronger effect on these two outcomes. In particular, the attrition effect ranges from 12-17 
percentage points, three times larger than the effect obtained in the baseline probits. 
Interestingly, females display a more pronounced program effect on attrition than do 
males. The larger estimates of the program effect are consistent with the hypothesis that 
JROTC participants are negatively selected and have unobserved characteristics that 
make them more likely to attrite and less likely to reenlist. The estimated correlation 
between the error terms in the participation and outcome equations also supports this 
claim: ρˆ is positive and significant in the attrition models, but negative in the reenlistment 
models. Therefore, our previous baseline estimates appear to underestimate the effect of 
                                                 
17
 It should be noted that in what follows we exclude individuals with erroneous zip code information 
(about 20% of the observations).  However, since we are using population data for eight cohorts of recruits, 
this data restriction does not substantially affect sample size or generalization of results. We found no 
evidence that erroneous zip codes were correlated with any observable characteristics of the recruits. 
Summary statistics for this restricted sample appeared very similar to the full sample. We believe that 
erroneous zip codes are due to coding errors.  
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the program on both job match and stability.  
VI. Fixed Effects Estimates 
 Next, we obtain estimates for the typical JROTC recruit by focusing on recruits 
who lived in the same zip code before enlisting, and by comparing those with and without 
JROTC. This estimation strategy differs from bivariate probit by not depending on an 
outside source of variation to predict participation. Fixed effects estimation assumes that 
recruits from the same zip code who did not participate in JROTC are more appropriate 
controls for JROTC participants than the average non-participant in the sample. This 
could be especially true if we assume that recruits who live in the same locality make 
participation, enlistment, and reenlistment decisions influenced by the same economic 
and social conditions.  
 Fixed effects logit estimates of the treatment effects are tabulated in Table 4 (odds-
ratios appear in brackets). JROTC participants are 17-23% less likely to attrite at different 
points in the first term, with the smaller effects occurring later in the term. Although 
fixed effects estimates are notably smaller than the bivariate probit estimates they still 
exceed the baseline estimates (which ranged from 9 to 17%), consistent with negative 
selection of JROTC participants. With respect to long-term job stability, JROTC 
participants are 22% more likely to reenlist than non-participants who resided in the same 
zip code. The magnitude of this effect exceeds both the baseline and the bivariate probit 
estimates.   
 The effect of JROTC on attrition is substantially larger for women than for men in 
both the bivariate probit and fixed effects results. The positive effect of JROTC on 
reenlistment decisions is confined to males in the bivariate probit results, but extends to 
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both males and females in the fixed effects results.  
 Compared to the baseline estimates, fixed effects deal with the bias induced from 
unobserved economic and social characteristics of the local area where JROTC recruits 
live, which may affect their decisions to join JROTC and to pursue a military career. 
Compared to the bivariate probit model, fixed effects methods recover the treatment 
effect for the typical JROTC recruit, or the treatment effect on the treated (ATT), whereas 
the former identifies the local treatment effect (LATE) from recruits who join JROTC 
because local schools offer the program. The difference in the estimates suggests that 
students induced to participate because the program is offered by the school gain more in 
terms of job match than the typical student who participates in JROTC. Fixed effects 
attrition estimates may be smaller than bivariate probit estimates also because the former 
do not control for the potentially higher military taste of JROTC participants, which may 
introduce a positive bias in the results. However, instrumenting individual participation 
with school offerings accounts for the possibility that recruits with JROTC backgrounds 
have a higher relative taste for the military, since the placement of the JROTC units in 
schools is not affected by the preferences of any single individual. For the purpose of 
evaluating the overall effect of the program, both the ATT and the LATE estimates are 
important. The average participant appears to have a more stable career and better job 
match than the average non-participant; however, these effects may be even stronger for 
marginal participants who would not have joined this program, had it not been for its 
availability.  
VII. Career progression 
To investigate the productivity effect of JROTC, we separately analyze promotion 
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to pay grades E4 and E5, which are the first competitive promotions during the first 
contract. Promotion to E4 is the targeted progression for new recruits based on ‘normal’ 
performance in training schools and on the job.  In contrast, promotion to E5 reflects 
superior performance. The analysis of promotions is complicated by the fact that JROTC 
participants normally enter the military at advanced pay grades (on average at E3, versus 
E1 for most non-JROTC recruits). To account for this, we also estimate promotion 
models that control for entry pay grade.18 
Promotion results are presented in Table 5.  All promotion models include 
individuals who survive for all four years. In Panel A, the baseline probit results indicate 
that JROTC recruits are slightly less likely to promote to the E4 grade. Controlling for 
their advanced entry pay grade increases this negative gap slightly (to 3.3 percentage 
points, or 3.6%). JROTC recruits are also less likely to promote to E5.  
In Panel B, the bivariate probit results reveal no significant differences in career 
progression for JROTC versus non-JROTC recruits. However, for females, the results 
suggest a positive effect of JROTC on promotion, even when conditioning upon entry 
grade. In Panel C, fixed effects estimates suggest that JROTC concentrators advance no 
differently than non-participants, but, when controlling for their advanced placement at 
entry, graduates progress more slowly.  
VIII. Occupation-specific Vocational Training 
To this point we have analyzed the effect of participation in ‘any’ JROTC 
program on job performance.  However, some Navy recruits with JROTC backgrounds 
complete a Navy-JROTC program whereas others complete a non-Navy program.  The 
                                                 
18 In addition, promotion timing is complicated by assignment of individuals to advanced skill training, 
which are based on ASVAB test scores, and the required training time for each skill area (Krause and 
Wenger, 2004). 
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military’s lifestyle and culture and its rigid internal labor market are sufficiently unique 
that the general job information, skills, and principles provided by all JROTC programs 
convey considerable value to program graduates.  However, Navy-JROTC graduates 
receive more specific job information and training.  Hence, ‘any JROTC’ will incorporate 
a continuum of skills ranging from general military knowledge to very job-specific skills.  
To differentiate the impact of these two backgrounds, we next separate those with 
JROTC backgrounds into those who completed Navy JROTC (NJROTC) and those who 
completed non-Navy JROTC (OJROTC). Comparing these two groups provides insights 
into whether occupation-specific training has a stronger effect than more general military 
training.19  Assuming that all JROTC participants share a similar military propensity, a 
comparison of NJROTC with OJROTC recruits provides a stronger test of the effect of 
occupation-specific vocational training on job attachment. Estimates are presented in 
Table 6.  Also, since all entrants with JROTC receive an advanced pay grade, this 
analysis sorts out whether occupation-specific skills are driving any differences in 
performance, especially promotion. 
For all of the attrition indicators in panel a, males with NJROTC are less likely to 
attrite than both recruits with no JROTC background and those who complete a non-
Navy JROTC curriculum. In contrast, for females it appears that completing a non-Navy 
JROTC curriculum is responsible for their lower early turnover. This suggests that 
women may benefit more from general military skills and job information than from 
Navy-specific vocational training.20  
                                                 
19 Bishop (1989) provides evidence that occupation-specific skills leads to better job performance than 
general vocational training. 
20 In auxiliary regressions in which the samples are restricted to JROTC participants, the difference in 
attrition rates between NJROTC and OJROTC recruits was significant in all regressions. 
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Panel B presents reenlistment results for Navy-specific JROTC trainees. The 
effect of completing Navy-JROTC on reenlistment appears quite strong for males, and 
dominates the effect of completing a non-Navy JROTC program. In contrast, for females, 
non-Navy JROTC again appears to have the stronger relative effect on reenlistment 
outcomes.  
Because we have no separate instruments for participation in Navy-specific 
JROTC and non-Navy JROTC, we do not estimate the differential effect of the 
curriculum for these subgroups via bivariate probit. However, the fixed effects estimates 
confirm the baseline estimates, suggesting that Navy-specific occupational training is 
associated with higher gains than general military training.   
IX. Conclusions 
This study contributes to the debate on the benefits of high school vocational 
education and STW programs. While the literature focuses on wages as an indicator of 
labor market success, we investigate the effect of programs that aim to smooth the 
transition from school to work on individual career progression. We use a rich data set 
on eight cohorts of new Navy recruits who received military-specific training in high 
school via the Junior ROTC program.  
We find that the occupation (military) training in high school received via the 
JROTC program reduces the short-term turnover of new recruits, improves their 
measured job productivity, and increases long-term job stability.  These effects appear to 
be driven in part by the occupation-specific skills received in high school, since males 
who completed Navy-JROTC perform better in the Navy than males who completed non-
Navy JROTC programs. Interestingly, for females, attending any JROTC curricula 
 21 
proves beneficial in terms of job performance.  Females appear to benefit more from 
general military training and information, rather than from Navy-specific training. The 
results suggest that an important effect of vocational training is to improve job match 
quality. While wage effects of vocational education may be disputable, depending on 
whether they are measured in the short or the long run, our results suggest that vocational 
education may increase life-time earnings by improving job match and job stability. 
Our results support prior studies that find that vocational education students do 
better when they work in jobs directly related to their occupational training (Neumann 
and Ziderman, 1991; 1993).  The reason appears to be that enhanced occupational skills 
improve the job match and reduce both short term and long term turnover.  It is 
noteworthy that the military requires extensive firm-specific training of new recruits, thus 
one benefit of the lower turnover is to increase the organization’s incentives to invest in 
further firm-specific training.  Our results also support arguments that employer 
involvement in vocational education is important to students’ ultimate success (Bishop 
1989).  It is perhaps surprising that we find no promotion advantage for JROTC students.  
This result is most likely due to the job hierarchy in the military and the promotion rules 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4. Fixed Effects Estimates of JROTC on Job Match and Job Stability 
  All N 
(zip codes) 
Males Females 
Job match      
12-month attrition  -0.260 252,937 -0.260 -0.288 
  (0.033)*** 3,773 (0.037)*** (0.115)** 
  [0.771]  [0.771] [0.750] 
24-month attrition  -0.230 253,660 -0.222 -0.234 
  (0.029)*** 3,860 (0.032)*** (0.084)*** 
  [0.795]  [0.801] [0.792] 
36-month attrition  -0.185 253,782 -0.173 -0.176 
  (0.027)*** 3,877 (0.030)*** (0.072)** 
  [0.831]  [0.841] [0.839] 
first term attrition  -0.182 253,844 -0.172 -0.144 
  (0.026)*** 3,887 (0.029)*** (0.066)** 
  [0.834]  [0.842] [0.866] 
Job stability      
reenlistment  0.205 161,708 0.194 0.214 
 (sample: 36 month stayers)  (0.032)*** 3,791 (0.037)*** (0.072)*** 
  [1.228]  [1.215] [1.239] 
Notes: The average number of individuals in the same zip code is 60, with a minimum of 2 and a maximum of 846. 
Standard errors are in parentheses; odds-ratios in brackets.  




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 6. Estimates of the Effect of Navy-Specific JROTC on Job Match and Job Stability 
 Probit   Fixed Effects 
Panel A.    Job match All Males Females All 
12-month attrition:        Navy JROTC -0.202 -0.228 -0.092 -0.348 
 (0.029)*** (0.032)*** (0.060) (0.059)*** 
 [-0.052] [-0.058] [-0.026] [0.706] 
Other JROTC -0.101 -0.093 -0.112 -0.222 
 (0.019)*** (0.021)*** (0.040)*** (0.039)*** 
 [-0.027] [-0.025] [-0.031] [0.801] 
24-month attrition:        Navy JROTC -0.181 -0.202 -0.085 -0.307 
 (0.026)*** (0.029)*** (0.056) (0.051)*** 
 [-0.058] [-0.063] [-0.028] [0.736] 
Other JROTC -0.087 -0.073 -0.108 -0.196 
 (0.017)*** (0.020)*** (0.037)*** (0.034)*** 
 [-0.028] [-0.024] [-0.036] [0.822] 
36-month attrition:        Navy JROTC -0.161 -0.167 -0.115 -0.264 
 (0.025)*** (0.028)*** (0.055)** (0.048)*** 
 [-0.057] [-0.058] [-0.042] [0.768] 
Other JROTC -0.055 -0.043 -0.067 -0.149 
 (0.017)*** (0.019)** (0.036)* (0.032)*** 
 [-0.020] [-0.015] [-0.024] [0.862] 
first term attrition:         Navy JROTC -0.150 -0.158 -0.096 -0.233 
 (0.024)*** (0.027)*** (0.053)* (0.046)*** 
 [-0.056] [-0.059] [-0.037] [0.792] 
Other JROTC -0.069 -0.060 -0.066 -0.158 
 (0.016)*** (0.019)*** (0.035)* (0.031)*** 
 [-0.026] [-0.022] [-0.025] [0.854] 
Panel B.  Job stability     
reenlistment:                  Navy JROTC 0.169 0.187 0.081 0.198 
 (0.029)*** (0.032)*** (0.064) (0.054)*** 
 [0.064] [0.070] [0.031] [1.219] 
Other JROTC 0.131 0.115 0.156 0.209 
 (0.021)*** (0.023)*** (0.044)*** (0.039)*** 
 [0.050] [0.044] [0.060] [1.233] 
     
See Notes to Table 2. 
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